Supreme Court Decides Transgender Sports Case

July 10, 2026

Important Takeaways: A State may pass a law banning biological males from competing in sports with biological females. States are not mandated to create such a ban, but they have the authority to do so.

Facts: On June 30, 2026, the United States Supreme Court decided two cases with similar facts. One case concerned Idaho’s 2020 legislation, the Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. That law prohibited biological males from competing in women’s sports. Lindsay Hecox, a transgender female track athlete at Boise State University, challenged the law on Equal Protection grounds.

The other case involved a similar law in West Virginia called the Save Women’s Sports Act. That law also limited participation in female sports to biological females. Becky Pepper-Jackson challenged the law after she was prohibited from participating as a female on her middle-school track team. Becky Pepper-Jackson began puberty-blocking treatment before she reached male puberty and argued that the state’s justifications for banning her from participation did not apply to her circumstances. Pepper-Jackson also challenged the law on Equal Protection grounds and under Title IX as sex discrimination.

In both cases, the respective Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the athletes and blocked enforcement of the state laws. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases due to the similarity in facts and applicable law.

Court findings: The Court began its analysis with Betty Pepper-Jackson’s Title IX claim. Title IX prohibits discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance on the basis of sex. 20 U. S. C. §1681(a). Pepper-Jackson claimed that West Virginia violated Title IX by passing a law that prohibited a transgender female who had never gone through puberty from participating in female athletics. Pepper-Jackson also claimed that her school district violated Title IX by enforcing policies in line with the Save Women’s Sports Act. The Supreme Court disagreed.

Originally, Title IX made no reference to sports. At the time of its enactment, Title IX prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in educational settings, including in school activities such as athletics. Two years after its enactment, President Ford signed the Javits Amendment. That amendment directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to promulgate reasonable regulations to implement Title IX, including provisions considering the nature of particular sports. The regulations required that schools provide “equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes” and authorized “separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport.” 34 CFR §§106.41(b), (c) (2025). Because the implementing regulations specifically authorize schools to create separate teams for members of each sex, the Supreme Court held that a school does not violate Title IX by separating athletic teams based on sex when the activity involves competitive skill or is a contact sport.

The question the Court then faced was whether prohibiting a transgender female who never went through puberty violated Title IX. To answer that question, the Court looked at the definition of sex in both the Save Women’s Sport Act and in the Title IX regulations. The Title IX regulations require schools to provide “equal athletic opportunit[ies] for members of both sexes.” 34 CFR §§106.41(c) (2025). The Court understood this to mean that, at the time the statutes were enacted in 1974, sex referred only to the two biological sexes, male and female. West Virginia law explicitly states that sex is determined by biology. Thus, the Save Women’s Sports Act does not violate Title IX by excluding a transgender female from competing with biological females because Title IX does not encompass transgender status; it only encompasses the two biological sexes. The Court justified its decision by pointing to the language of the implementing regulations. For example, the Court stated that because the regulations referred to “contact sports and competitive skill, the regulations plainly recognized the inherent physical differences between biological men and biological women—as well as the safety and competitive fairness concerns that would arise if males were allowed to compete in female sports.” West Virginia v. B. P. J.; Little, et al. v. Hecox, 609 U.S. Nos. 24–43 and 24–38 (2026).

Still, the question remained on whether an athlete who never underwent puberty, and thus wouldn’t possess the inherent physical differences between biological men and biological women, should be prevented from competing with biological women. Becky Pepper-Jackson argued that none of the Court’s concerns would apply in her situation. The Court responded by saying that neither the “texts of Title IX, the Javits Amendment, and the Title IX regulations do not say (or even hint) that schools must allow certain biological males to participate in women’s and girls’ sports. Nor do the statute or regulations say that schools must make an exception for those biological males who identify as female and have taken puberty blockers or hormones.” Id. In short, the Court relied entirely on black-letter law to guide its decision. Those laws do not differentiate between certain types of biological males. Instead, the laws only refer to males and females. Thus, the Court was unwilling to define sex in a way that expanded on what Title IX was originally intended to protect.

Pepper-Jackson then articulated two more reasons why the West Virginia law violated Title IX. First, she argued that the school policy violated Title IX because it effectively excluded her from participating in any competitive sports. Pepper-Jackson reasoned that because she underwent puberty-blocking therapy before she entered puberty, she would not be able to make any of the male athletic teams. The Court responded by stating that Title IX only guarantees “equal athletic opportunity.” Id. The regulations cannot and do not guarantee every student a spot on a team’s roster.

Finally, Pepper-Jackson argued that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bostock v. Clayton County, which provided that Title VII protections extend to gender orientation, is applicable in Title IX situations. 590 U. S. 644, 662 (2020). The Court, however, differentiated Title VII from Title IX. Title VII generally requires that men and women be treated without regard to their sex. In the sports context, by contrast, Title IX specifically authorizes separate teams for men and women because of the inherent biological differences. In other words, in the context of sports, Title IX treats men and women differently because of their sex. The Court could not extend Title VII decisions to the Title IX sports-specific context because of that fundamental difference between the two laws.

The Court then moved on to its Equal Protection Clause analysis. Under Supreme Court precedent, laws that classify people by sex are subject to intermediate scrutiny. That means the law must be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.

The States offered two important governmental interests. First, the States argued that by prohibiting biological males from competing against biological females, the law prevents serious physical injuries to female athletes. The Court agreed that there is a high risk of serious injury in contact sports such as hockey, basketball, and soccer. The Court also found increased safety risks in non-contact sports such as softball and volleyball. The second important interest advanced by the States concerned competitive fairness. The States argued that allowing biological males, even with testosterone blockers, to play in female sports would put biological females at a debilitating disadvantage. The Court agreed with this argument and noted that sports are generally zero-sum. The Court means that there are winners and losers at every turn during a sports season. For example, adding a biological male to a female team would most likely result in a biological female losing her spot. Or it would lead to a biological female being dropped from the starting lineup. Or it would lead to a biological female losing the chance at a medal.

The Court agreed that both governmental interests were important. The final question in the Equal Protection analysis is whether banning biological males from competing in female athletics is substantially related to those interests. The Court found that it is.

The plaintiffs tried to argue that the safety and competitive fairness concerns did not apply to a small subclass of biological males who, like Betty Pepper-Jackson, underwent testosterone blockers and hormone therapy before puberty. However, the Court did not accept the plaintiff’s argument. The Court noted that “the current public medical and scientific record does not definitively establish that the 27 States, the IOC, the USOPC, and the NCAA are wrong in acting on the basis that at least some biological males who have taken puberty blockers or hormones still retain physical advantages over females.” West Virginia, at 25. The Court held the sports context, States may treat all biological males the same and treat all biological females the same, given the inherent physical differences between biological males and biological females.

The Court ruled in favor of the States on both Title IX and Equal Protection grounds.

What this means: Montana has a similar law to those at issue in West Virginia v. B. P. J. and Little v. Hecox. The Supreme Court ruling clarifies that Montana’s law does not violate Title IX or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

Under § 20-7-1306(2), MCA, biological males cannot compete on teams that are designated for females. That means that transgender females cannot compete in girls’ soccer, volleyball, basketball, track, cross-country, wrestling, softball, swimming, golf, or tennis. However, the law does not ban biological females from competing in the same sport as biological males. Thus, a transgender male can play in all sports designated for males.

MHSA has deferred its decision on transgender participation to the Montana Legislature under Article 2, Section 2.11 of its Rules and Regulations.

In sum, Montana law prohibits transgender females from participating in sports that have designated female teams. The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the law does not violate federal or constitutional law. MHSA’s rules mirror § 20-7-1306(2).

West Virginia v. B. P. J.; Little, et al. v. Hecox, 609 U.S. Nos. 24–43 and 24–38 (2026). Read it here.

Please contact Bea, Megan, Kevin, Beth, or Kali if you have any questions.